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History and historical linguistics:  
two types of cognitive reconstruction? 
 
Patrick Honeybone 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Abstract 
This article compares principles and practice in history and (structural) historical 
linguistics. I argue that the disciplines can be both connected and distinguished by 
the recognition that they engage in acts of cognitive reconstruction. I show that 
such reconstruction is fundamental to both disciplines, but that they do it 
differently: historical linguistics reconstructs unconscious entities, while history 
reconstructs at the conscious level. For these arguments to go through, certain 
commitments are required from the disciplines’ philosophies: mentalism of the 
type associated with Chomsky’s linguistics, and idealism of the type associated 
with Collingwood’s history. Although cognitive reconstruction is important to both 
areas of study, it is not all they do: to provide the context for my arguments, I also 
consider a number of other connections and distinctions between the disciplines, in 
terms of the questions that they can ask, the evidence available to them, and their 
relationships to synchrony and diachrony. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The academic disciplines of history and historical linguistics clearly have some things 
in common – they both deal with aspects of the past, after all. There is also much that 
differentiates them, however, in their aims and methodologies, and in their intellectual 
context and traditions. In this article I argue that we should recognise one particular 
point which both connects and distinguishes the disciplines, in ways which are not 
commonly discussed (and I consider a few other things which link or differentiate 
them, too).1 The main point has to do with the very nature of their objects of enquiry, 
and it will require us to entertain a set of controversial but compelling assumptions 
about the philosophy of the disciplines. The article can be seen as a contribution to the 
comparative philosophy of disciplines, and its main aim is to help us better 
understand what it is that we do when we do historical linguistics and/or history (or, at 
least, central parts of them), and also in what it is that we don’t. 
 I do not compare everything that historical linguists and historians do here, nor 
everything that they are interested in. Rather, in seeking to answer the fundamental 
questions ‘what is the object of study in history?’ and ‘what is the object of study in 
historical linguistics?’ I argue that certain fundamental aims in the two disciplines 
allow us to remove the question mark in the title to this piece: history and historical 
                                               
1 For discussion of these ideas, I would like to thank Nils Langer, Michael and Diana Honeybone, and 
the audiences at the Workshop on History and Linguistics, Linguistics and Historiography at the 
University of Bristol in 2008, and at a talk in the Language and History Interdisciplinary Seminar at 
the University of Oxford in 2009. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for comments 
on a draft of this article. Any errors remaining are, of course, my own. 
linguistics do engage in two – interestingly connected, but also quite different – types 
of cognitive reconstruction.  
 In section 2, I consider a number of basic connections and differences between the 
two disciplines that are our focus; these are mostly beyond the main topic under 
consideration here, but they provide a context for the discussion in sections 3, 4 and 5. 
These latter sections consider historical linguistics and history in the light of the idea 
proposed in the article’s title: section 3 focuses on historical linguistics, and section 4 
on history. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. History and historical linguistics: parallels and differences 
One obvious difference between historical linguistics and history is that historical 
linguistics is a subdiscipline, or branch, of a larger area of study: linguistics. ‘History’ 
is equivalent to ‘linguistics’ as a superordinate disciplinary term, which itself has 
second-level subfields, such as social history and political history. Certain 
characteristics of historical linguistics are inherited due to it being a ‘type of 
linguistics’, so some of what follows compares aspects of history with aspects of 
general linguistics.2 With this in mind, we can recognise a basic difference in the two 
fields’ terminologies: for linguistics, there is a handy distinction between (1a) and 
(1b), whereas the equivalent is absent for history, as (2a) and (2b) show. 
 
(1a) the name of the discipline: linguistics 
(1b) the discipline’s object of study: language  
 
(2a) the name of the discipline: history1 
(2b) the discipline’s object of study: history2 
 
It could be claimed that (2b) should be ‘the past’, but there are reasons to reject this: 
history1 typically requires human agency (or even written records) for its subject 
matter to count, something considered in some detail in section 4. To be of interest to 
history1, these acts of human agency need to have occurred in the past, but that is not 
the same as simply being the past. The term ‘history’ is thus ambiguous (an obvious 
point, long made by others writing on the nature of history, such as Carr 1961), and as 
it is important to be clear about the terms used in a piece such as this, it might 
sometimes help to have the subscriptal distinction in (2). I use this in the current 
section, but - rather than cluttering the whole article with subscripts - I adopt the 
convention in later sections that, if no subscript is given, then ‘history’ should be 
taken to mean history1 (as has been implicit up till now).  
                                               
2 As Lass (1997: 27) has it: “The primary constraint on a historical subject is its non-historical 
metasubject. Historical biology is part of biology, and hence constrained by biological knowledge and 
theory; historical linguistics is a branch of linguistics, constrained by non-historical linguistic 
knowledge and theory.” We will see below (in sections 2.1 and 3) how constraints developed in general 
linguistics can play a role in historical linguistics. Incidentally, history, as a metasubject, is unusual in 
not having a historical sub-subject – there is historical sociology, historical geography and historical 
anthropology, for example – but, perhaps because we need to avoid going round in circles, there is no 
historical history (there is ‘the history of history’, but that’s a different matter). This could be seen as a 
further difference between the two disciplines in question here. On the other hand, historians do have 
the useful term historiography, to refer to the study of the writing of history as an academic discipline. 
There is no equivalent linguisticography, but this is simply a lexical gap, as the linguistic equivalent 
has long been studied. If we were to fill the gap, this article might even be described as a contribution 
to comparative historiography and linguisticography. 
 It might seem reasonable to expect ‘historical linguistics’ to be an interdisciplinary 
branch of enquiry existing in the overlap between history1 and linguistics. This is not, 
however, where much of historical linguistics lies. Considerable work in historical 
linguistics deals with autonomously linguistic structural entities (‘autonomous’ in the 
sense of Newmeyer 1986, for example), such as phonological segments and syntactic 
categories, and these entities are not subject to the conscious human will that history1 
considers. This is not to say that no part of historical linguistics overlaps with history1 
– some parts of it certainly do, and there is an intersecting area of study where 
precisely the same questions can be asked. It may well be that this is where much of 
‘historical sociolinguistics’ lies (the fact that such work is also known as ‘the social 
history of language’ – as in Burke 2004 – corroborates this idea). Historical linguistics is 
thus not a unitary (sub)discipline, because it groups together any aspect of anything 
which connects language or language use with history2. 
 Questions which need both historical and linguistic investigation include such basic 
issues as: how does the standardisation of languages occur? There are clearly 
linguistic issues involved in standardisation, but we also need to understand the social 
relations and context which motivated the individuals who enacted the process, and 
this requires historical methods. Specific questions which exist in the disciplinary 
overlap might include: what role did the idea that there was a Czech language play in 
political developments in the Central Europe? and what impact did this have on the 
Slavic dialect(s) spoken there? (see, for example, Törnquist-Plewa 2000, Evans 1998) 
or what were the demographics of the people involved in the early colonisation of New 
Zealand? and how did this lead to the formation of the ‘new-dialect’ of New Zealand 
English? (see, for example, Trudgill 2004). Such questions can all be part of historical 
linguistics, but they are not the kinds of questions considered in this article. I focus 
here (mostly in section 3) on issues of autonomous linguistic structure which are 
primarily or only of interest to linguists.  
 With this restriction, we can identify a number of parallels between history1 and (at 
least the structural part of) historical linguistics. One seems obvious, so much so that 
we have noted it already: both are connected with aspects of (actions from, states that 
existed in) the past, as spelt out in (3).  
 
(3a) history1 aims to understand past actions 
(3b) historical linguistics aims to understand past linguistic systems 
 
There are two reasons why this is not in fact as obvious as it seems: (i) it requires us 
to reject the postmodern approach to history1, and (ii) it requires us to tease apart the 
synchronic and diachronic approach to the study of the past.  
 Postmodernism is a contentious and complex philosophical current in history1 (see, 
for example, O’Brian 2001 and Munslow 2001), as in many other fields. Some 
historians (such as Jenkins 1991 and Munslow 2001) avowedly subscribe to it, to 
argue, contrary to (3a), that we cannot ever rediscover or, therefore, truly understand 
history2. Postmodern history ties in with the general postmodernist distrust that 
anything could ever be objectively true, or that we can ever understand the thoughts 
of anyone other than ourselves, arguing that we are tied to our own contemporary 
linguistically-determined world-view. This means, the claim goes, that history1 just 
tells possible tales about history2, and other tales are always just as reasonable (for 
example, Munslow 2001 writes that “[m]y history is just another cultural practice that 
studies cultural practice”). 
 The approach that I consider here requires us to reject postmodern doubt, and to 
assume that we are indeed able to understand history2 in terms of how it actually was 
(following, for example, Evans 1998 and O’Brien 2001), just as we can hope to 
understand the truth about physics and medicine. It is noteworthy that postmodernism 
has not been influential in linguistics (as it is generally conceived) - another 
difference between the two disciplines.3 Perhaps this is because many linguists view 
linguistics as more of a science than a humanity (and postmodernism has found no 
place in science), but it may also be that the very existence of historical semantics and 
etymology – one branch of linguistics – contradicts or conflicts with postmodern 
tenets. The argument from etymology is that we are able to recover the meaning of 
words from the past, with some painstaking work, and hence we can understand what 
others mean, or meant. In its own way, this point flags up a further connection 
between historical linguistics and history1 – the latter relies on the former to some 
degree, because historians do need to rely on a firm reconstruction of the meaning of 
the texts that they work with if they are to escape the postmodern current. Thanks to 
postmodernist arguments, historians are more conscious of the significance of 
language to historical study (taking a ‘linguistic turn’), but while we know that words 
can change their meaning – an example of this is given in (11), below – an awareness 
of the results of etymology (along with a judicious use of materials such as 
dictionaries which are contemporary with the texts that are being studied) allows us to 
reject the postmodern position, as is necessary for the argument to be made below to 
go through. 
 For (3) to make sense, we also need to tease apart synchrony and diachrony. This 
distinction is inescapable in linguistics following its description in Saussure (1916), a 
fundamental text for twentieth century linguistics. A synchronic approach focuses on 
a particular system at one point in time, whereas a diachronic approach focuses on the 
changes that occur between chronologically successive instantiations of one particular 
system. This is quite straightforward in principle: it was recognised by linguists 
before Saussure named it, and the same distinction is made in other historical 
disciplines, even if under different names (for example, Warkentin 2009 talks of the 
‘horizontal approach’ - that is, synchrony - and the ‘vertical approach’ - diachrony - 
in historical geography). 
 A naïve view of historical linguistics and history1 might expect both to be purely 
diachronic disciplines (for example, Pei 1965 writes “[a] term often used as a 
synonym for historical linguistics is diachronic linguistics”), but for (3a) and (3b) to 
hold, they must study synchrony: a particular action can only occur at one specific 
point in history2, and past linguistic systems exist at specific points in history2. In fact, 
historical linguistics and history1 can and do focus on both diachrony and synchrony: 
for example, we might synchronically study the society or politics of the kingdom of 
Prussia in the middle of the nineteenth-century, or we might study the diachrony of 
the changing organisation of the German states during the nineteenth-century; or we 
might synchronically study the phonology of mid-fifteenth-century Middle English, 
or the diachrony of the changes in the tense vowel system of English from the end of 
the Middle English period to the start of Late Modern English. The 
synchrony/diachrony distinction will prove important below. 
                                               
3 Rather oddly, some postmodern philosophers claim that they are doing linguistics, or at least are 
interacting with the concepts that linguistics deals with (e.g., Derrida 1967), or that linguistics was 
fundamental in the pathway of postmodernist ideas, through the development of structuralism. For a 
clear explanation of the bafflement that this causes in linguists, see Dresher (1999), and for a 
demolition of some of the small amount of work in (applied) linguistics which has been influenced by 
postmodern ideas, see Borsley (2000). 
 We can recognise one further parallel between historical and historical linguistic 
method, if only because it flags up one way in which the two disciplines are similar 
(even if the terminology used in this area hides this). This is pointed out in (4). 
 
(4a) the historical linguist uses both direct and indirect evidence 
(4b) the historian uses both witting and unwitting testimony 
 
 The observations in (4) describe two types of sources available in the two 
disciplines. The distinction in (4a) is analogous to that in (4b), and it is implicit in (4) 
that both disciplines are limited in similar ways by the evidence that is available to 
them. If we take historical phonology as an example of work in historical linguistics, 
the two parts of (4a) can be explained as follows: in order to do historical phonology, 
we need to know how past phonological systems worked (which sounds they used, 
how they were organised, etc.). Direct evidence for this includes overt comments on 
pronunciation from past orthoepists and spelling reformers (such as Hart 1569, who 
devised his own phonetic alphabets to better represent English phonology); they 
needed to explicitly describe how people spoke in the sixteenth century in order to be 
able to write about what they wanted. Indirect evidence for historical phonology 
includes the consideration of spellings in documents from the past, and of rhymes and 
puns from past linguistic states, none of which was intended to provide special 
evidence about phonology (see, for example, Dobson 1968, Jones 1989 and Lass to 
appear). Marwick (2001a, b) explains the (4b) distinction used in history1, writing: “ 
‘Witting’ means ‘deliberate’ or ‘intentional’; ‘unwitting’ means ‘unaware’ or 
‘unintentional’. ‘Testimony’ means ‘evidence’. Thus, ‘witting testimony’ is the 
deliberate or intentional message of a document or other source; the ‘unwitting 
testimony’ is the unintentional evidence (about, for example, the attitudes and values 
of the author, or about the ‘culture’ to which he/she belongs) that it also contains.” 
The parallel in (4) is that both disciplines consider a range of types of sources, which 
require parallel types of interpretative skill: some aspects of these sources aim to tell 
the reader something, and are hidden until research reveals them. 
 
2.1 How can cognitive reconstruction be relevant? 
In order to show that history and historical linguistics are linked through cognitive 
reconstruction, we need to establish why we should want to discuss cognitive states at 
all. The distinctions made in (1) and (2) are worded as if they were very simple; like 
most things, though, they are not. The claim that cognitive reconstruction is involved 
in both branches of study derives from positions that have been developed in the 
disciplines’ philosophies concerning the true nature of (1b) and (2b) - of their objects 
of study. They are set out in (5) and (6). 
 
(5) in history1: the ‘idealist’ position (eg, Collingwood 1946) 
 = the aim of history1 is to rethink the thoughts of people from the past 
 
(6) in linguistics: the ‘mentalist’ orientation (eg, Chomsky 1965) 
 = language exists in the minds of speakers  
 
 The claims in (5) and (6) both link their respective areas of study to the cognitive 
realm, and will be crucial to the central argument in this article. They are bold and 
controversial claims, and I explain their bases in sections 3 and 4. In order to do that, 
one final connection between the two disciplines needs to be recognised: 
 
(7) both historical linguistics and history1 rely on cognitive uniformitarianism  
 
 The assumption in (7) is that humans and the human mind have been qualitatively 
the same throughout history, so that the fundamental nature of the language that is 
investigated in historical linguistics and the thoughts that are considered in history1 
have always been the same. The essential assumption is that both history1 and 
historical linguistics can only consider the history2 of modern humans and would not 
seek to consider anything beyond that (thus D’Oro 2006 writes that “[i]n ordinary 
usage history tends to be identified not with natural history but with the history of 
human affairs”). If we assume that the brain has not evolved since the development of 
modern humans somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 years ago, we can 
reasonably adopt a uniformitarian position on the mind: the ways in which our brains 
allow us to think have not changed, so uniformitarianism is realistic in history1, and as 
language is uncontroversially enabled in some way by what is in our minds (for 
Chomsky it is constrained by Universal Grammar which guides the acquisition of 
language), uniformitarianism in historical linguistics is reasonable, too.  
 As Lass (1997: 28) shows, by quoting Whitney (1867: 24), a basic, non-cognitive 
uniformitarianism has been adopted by some in historical linguistics since at least the 
late nineteenth-century, when it was in its prime: 
 
The nature and uses of speech [...] cannot but have been essentially the same during all 
periods of its history [...] there is no way in which its unknown past can be investigated, 
except by the careful study of its living present and recorded past, and the extension and 
application to remote conditions of laws and principles deduced by that study. 
 
 This practically spells out general uniformitarianism, which was first established in 
geology: the principles governing the world were the same in the past as they are 
today, and if we establish the principles that govern an object of enquiry by 
considering how it works in the present (or perhaps also, at Whitney says, in parts of 
the past that we understand well), we can restrict our ideas about how that object 
could have been in the parts of past that we need to understand. For our purposes, 
uniformitarianism means that (i) we should not allow for any kind of language during 
history2 which violates the linguistic principles that we have come to understand 
through our intuition- and corpus-based investigation of contemporary languages, and 
that (ii) we can assume that human actions and thoughts during history2 were 
produced on the basis of the same kinds of thoughts and impulses that we humans 
have today, which area available for investigation. If the claims in (5) and (6) are 
right, cognitive uniformitarianism is an important methodological guide. 
 Understood this way, both history1 and historical linguistics are interested in things 
which existed in peoples’ minds during history2. The claim that both disciplines 
involve cognitive reconstruction is thus beginning to become clear. To justify it fully, 
we need to consider what it is that historical linguists and historians do. I turn to this 
in the next two sections. 
 
 
3. What do historical linguists do? 
In order to make my case, I need to show that there is an aim in (at least part of) both 
historical linguistics and history4 to carry out cognitive reconstruction. The argument 
is easier to make, and more widely accepted in historical linguistics. I explain its basis 
                                               
4 From now on, unless otherwise indicated, ‘history’ = ‘history1’. 
here. 
 Two commitments from the philosophy of the discipline are needed to make the 
case. These are (i) the fundamental orientation towards mentalism in linguistics, 
mentioned in (6), and (ii) a commitment from historical linguistics concerning the 
status of the results of historical linguists’ work: we must be able to give them a 
realist, and not formulist interpretation. I explain both of these briefly below: the 
assumption of mentalism immediately, and the requirement of realism in section 3.1. 
 The claim in (6) is that the object of study in linguistics is a mental, or cognitive, 
object. This is not uncontroversial, but we cannot consider all the arguments that have 
been had about the nature of language here; what is important, and is obvious to all, is 
that humans have knowledge of language stored in their minds – it is not contentious 
to say that we need to involve the cognitive realm when we speak. The idea that 
language is a cognitive entity is often associated with the ‘ideal speaker-hearer’ 
approach of generativism, one of the mainstream positions in linguistics (although not 
all aspects of the generative approach need be adopted for my fundamental claim to 
be accepted). From within this tradition, Chomsky has long argued that we need to 
recognise a distinction between ‘language’ and ‘the use of language’. This is 
essentially the same distinction that Saussure (1916) proposed between ‘langue’ and 
‘parole’, so it has long roots. Building on an early (1965) distinction between 
competence and performance, Chomsky (1986) discusses a distinction between I-
Language and E-Language. I-Language is an aspect of knowledge - it is the set of 
linguistic generalisations that we know in order to be able to speak our language (or 
languages). For example, we know that in English, the regular plural is formed by 
adding an alveolar fricative which takes its voicing from the final segment in the word 
that it attaches to (so we say [kats] cats but [kabz] cabs), and we know that wh-
phrases like what and how many occur at the start of clauses in questions. Like all 
types of knowledge, I-language is i-nternal to each i-ndividual. It is the grammar that 
exists in the mind/brain of speakers. ‘E-language’ refers to the utterances that 
speakers make when they talk or write. This connects with everything else that the 
‘everyday sense’ of language involves, including everything connected to language 
which is e-xternal to the speaker, such as the communities that they belong to. 
 The standard generative opinion is that linguists who aim to understand such 
purely (autonomously) linguistic generalisations about phonology, syntax and similar 
aspects of language should focus on I-language. E-language is subject to influence 
from many different areas: physical pressures affecting linguistic performance, social 
and political pressures affecting interactions, and historical contingency in terms of 
what speakers happen to talk about. The claim is that the set of utterances that 
speakers make is not a well-formed or coherent object, and it is not enough if we hope 
to discover the generative system that constitutes the language. We cannot wait for 
occurrences of everything that is possible in a language in corpora of utterances, and 
they cannot tell us what is impossible in a language, so E-language is not the right 
object of study if we aim to figure out the generative system that a speaker knows. 
This is not to say that E-language is uninteresting or unworthy of study: the sociology 
and history of languages and the interactions and perceptions of their speakers are 
major objects of study which we need in order to understand the human condition; 
corpus linguistics has told us a lot about collocation and frequency, but these things 
are facts about how speakers use their language, not about language itself.   
 Mentalism need not be stripped of all aspects of linguistic variation, however (as it 
often is in generative approaches). In order to use their language appropriately, 
speakers need to know about the types of variation that the members of their speech 
community engage in, so this must be part of their knowledge about language – 
perhaps not precisely the same kind of knowledge that we have about purely 
structural linguistic, but it, too, points in the direction of mentalism for linguistics. 
The mentalist case that ‘language’ exists in the minds of speakers, as I-linguistic states 
of knowledge, has been clearly made in mainstream branches of linguistics. It gives 
linguists of a structural bent a coherent object of study, and I adopt it here. 
 
3.1 Does historical linguistics involve cognitive reconstruction? 
We have seen that is it reasonable to claim that language is a cognitive entity. The case 
that historical linguistics engages in cognitive reconstruction is now not that difficult to 
argue. If language exists in the mind, and if one of the things that historical linguists 
do is to try to work out the structure of past synchronic linguistic states, then 
historical linguistics engages in cognitive reconstruction. In this section, I consider the 
ways in which historical linguists try to work out the structure of past synchronic 
linguistic states, and then I turn to issues that some linguists raise concerning the 
status of the reconstructions that are done in the discipline.  
 One of the earliest and greatest achievements of historical linguistics was the proof 
that many currently existing languages are ‘genetically’ related to each other – that 
they derive in some real sense from the same ancestor proto-language. For example, 
we know that most of the languages spoken in Europe (and the countries to which 
they have been colonially exported in the past few centuries), and many spoken in 
Asia are derived from Proto-Indo-European (PIE). One of the central aims in 
nineteenth-century linguistics was to reconstruct proto-languages, especially PIE, 
about whose daughter languages much is known, and work on PIE continues today. 
The great tool for such work is the comparative method of reconstruction, in which 
forms for a particular linguistic feature are compared in related languages, to establish 
correspondences of form, which are then considered together to establish what is the 
most likely ancestral form from which they all could have derived (for a full 
description of the method, see Fox 1995). These forms are taken to be the 
reconstructed linguistic features of the proto-language. 
 A classic example is the reconstruction of the PIE stop system. Although most 
European languages have two series of stops – often transcribed as /p, t, k/ vs /b, d, g/ 
– we can be sure that PIE had three series, thanks to the evidence of languages like 
Sanskrit and Greek, which preserve multiple stop series. Also, we know that one of 
the series of PIE stops became fricatives in Proto-Germanic, so that contemporary 
English three, with an initial fricative, corresponds with Ancient Greek treis, Latin 
tres, Old Church Slavonic trije and Old Irish tri, for example, which all have stops 
(nominative masculine forms for three given here where the number declines in a 
language). To summarise some of this, (8) shows in its final column the classic 
reconstruction of the three series of PIE stops (with the coronal stop standing for the 
full series), which have been reconstructed on the basis of the oldest attested forms 
including those given in the other columns (taken from Job 1989). ‘OCS’ stands for 
Old Church Slavonic, the oldest attested Slavic language, ‘Vedic’ is a form of 
Sanskrit, and Gothic represents the Germanic languages, such as English, so it has a 
fricative (as in three) corresponding to stops in the other languages. The 
overwhelming preponderance of stops in non-Germanic languages shows that the PIE 
reconstruction of a stop is on firm ground. 
 
(8) 
Avestan Vedic Greek Latin Old Irish Gothic OCS PIE 
t t t t t θ t t 
d d d d d t d d 
d dh th f d d d dh 
 
The forms in the last column in (8) are an attempt to reconstruct the stop system of a 
language for which we have no records. Given that it was argued above that the only 
coherent locus to situate a language, in its technical sense, is in the minds of its 
speakers, this means that what is shown here is an attempt at cognitive reconstruction 
– a reconstruction of something that existed at some synchronic point in the minds of 
the speakers of PIE. 
 Two points should be raised here. Firstly, it is common practice in historical 
linguistics to indicate forms which have been reconstructed in this way with an 
asterisk, to contrast them with forms which are attested in written documents and the 
like. This means that PIE /t/ is commonly represented as *t, for example. I do not 
adopt this practice here because all the forms given in (8) are reconstructed in some 
way, as discussed below, so the status of the PIE form is not fundamentally different 
from the other forms in (8). Secondly, we should note that the classic reconstruction 
of PIE stops has been subject to considerable challenge. It is not in doubt that there 
were three series of stops, but linguists have argued at length about the precise way in 
which they should be reconstructed. The best known alternative reconstruction is the 
‘Glottalic Theory’ of Gamkrelidze & Ivanov (1973), which can be seen as contending 
that rather than voiceless/plain, voiced and voiced aspirated series, there were 
voiceless aspirated, ejective and voiced aspirated series. Proposals such as the 
Glottalic Theory have been made for a number of reasons, in part centring around the 
idea that the classic reconstruction is typologically highly unlikely, because we do not 
expect to find languages with a breathy voiced (‘voiced aspirated’) series, like /dh/ if 
they do not also have a voiceless aspirated series, like /th/; that is, the 
uniformitarianism of (7) is applied. Far from casting doubt on the assumption that the 
final column in (8) is a case cognitive reconstruction, however, the fact that linguists 
argue about the best way to reconstruct a language shows that they care about getting 
the cognitive reconstruction right. The uniformitarian constraints of general 
linguistics on what is a possible language only apply to a reconstructed language if 
the reconstruction is taken to be psychologically real. 
 By PIE, then, we mean the I-linguistic grammar that a speaker of PIE had. In the same 
way, when historical linguists work to figure out any aspect of an attested language such 
as Old English (OE), they are trying to reconstruct the mental grammar of speakers of OE 
(at a particular point in its development, such as classical West Saxon). It may be that in 
certain cases we can never be successful in reconstructing complete past I-languages – 
if evidence in a particular case is scant, for example – but we can still hope to 
reconstruct at least parts of past languages fully, such as the plosive or fricative 
system of the language, or its nominal morphology, and these parts were mental 
(sub)systems in their own right. 
 To consider an example of synchronic cognitive reconstruction from OE, we know 
from a range of types of evidence that OE had essentially only one series of fricatives, of 
the type /f, T, s/; there were no voiced fricatives of the type /v, D, z/. We also know that 
OE fricatives were subject to a phonological process of intersonorant voicing. To 
exemplify with the labial-dentals, this means that the fricatives in fisc ‘fish’ and wulf 
‘wolf’ were voiceless [f] on the surface, but that those in wulfas ‘wolves’ and drifan 
‘drive’ were voiced [v] (as many have shown, such as Hogg 1992a, Lass 1994).5  
 This takes us beyond comparative reconstruction. However, while evidence in the 
form of written texts is available for this reconstruction, the issues for the historical 
linguist are essentially the same. This is why I do not adopt the asterisk to mark 
‘reconstructed’ forms in PIE: all historical linguistics deals with reconstructed forms. 
Historical linguists aim to work out past I-languages, and it is clear that past I-
languages, as objects of enquiry, cannot be observed. This is exactly the same for OE 
(Middle Dutch, nineteenth-century Korean, etc.) as it is for PIE: none of them can be 
observed. The ultimate object of study for historical phonologists who work with 
attested languages is not the written forms. Written forms can provide important 
evidence for historical phonology, but they need to be interpreted with skill and 
caution (see, for example, Lass to appear, Minkova to appear). Thus, the OE letter <f> 
is not a phonological (I-linguistic) object, but fisc, wulf, wulfas, drifan, as examples of 
preserved E-language from the past, can be used as evidence in the reconstruction of 
the I-language of the speakers who wrote the Old English texts that survive. In the 
same way, the comparison of attested forms such as three with an initial fricative (and 
Gothic nominative neuter þrija, the oldest Germanic form for ‘three’) with the 
overwhelming majority of other Indo-European languages which have a stop (such as 
Latin tres and Old Church Slavonic trije), as summarised in (8), can be used as 
evidence in the reconstruction of a /t/ in the I-language of the PIE speakers (who 
happened not to leave us any written records). The OE reconstruction of an 
underlying /f/, which was realised as [f] and [v], is a reconstruction - it is not 
anything that is found in texts. Past phonological systems need to be reconstructed by 
(historical) phonologists using evidence from written sources (and from elsewhere, 
such as the forms found in living descendent dialects, and direct evidence from 
commentaries on pronunciation, where it is available), and this means that both OE /f/ 
and PIE /t/ are reconstructed and thus have the same phonological status, meaning 
that neither (or both) need an asterisk.6 
 We have dealt with historical phonology in some detail here, but the same 
conceptual issues arise in the reconstruction of other linguistic levels. I give here 
much briefer examples of the reconstruction of past syntactic and semantic states. The 
same range of indirect and direct evidence is available to do such reconstruction 
(written records, the comparative method, linguistic commentaries from the past), but 
comparative reconstruction is less successful in syntax because the systems involved 
are less straightforwardly compared. 
 A syntactic example: OE is reconstructed as a verb-second (V2) language, similar 
to contemporary German and Dutch. This means that the finite verb is expected to be 
the second constituent in main clauses (some syntactic processes can ‘hide’ this order, 
                                               
5 In fact, the precise laryngeal characteristics of the segments involved are subject to debate, like those 
of IE, but for different reasons (see Honeybone 2005). The current article is not the place for that 
debate, however, and the basic point stands whatever position is taken in laryngeal phonology. Once 
again, the fact that there is such debate shows that it is important to get the reconstruction right. 
6 In fact, it can be argued that the reconstructed linguistic entities of past languages have the same 
status as analyses of contemporary I-languages, too. Neither a past linguistic state nor a present one can 
be directly observed by a linguist. Rather, we need to use whatever E-linguistic evidence is available to 
us to figure out what the linguistic system is that we are investigating, and the result of linguistic 
analysis – the model of linguistic knowledge that we develop – is always constructed by the linguist. 
There is more and better evidence available to those investigating a contemporary language, such as 
native speaker intuitions, recordings, controlled experiments and massive corpora, but this construction 
of analyses of contemporary languages is essentially the same kind of activity as the reconstruction of 
deal languages: both are building models of I-languages using the best available evidence. 
but it is assumed to be fundamental). Unlike in contemporary English, where the 
subject typically comes directly before the verb, many different kinds of constituents 
could directly precede the verb in OE: subjects, objects, adverbials etc. The sentences 
in (9), from Orosius, and (10), from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles (both taken from 
Kroch & Taylor 1997), show the effects of V2: as is shown in the aligned gloss below 
the original OE, (9) has the finite verb (marked as ‘V2’), preceded by its direct object 
(‘O’) and followed by the subject (‘S’), and (10) has an adverbial (‘A’) where (9) has 
an object. The reconstruction of the synchronic syntactic patterns which allowed this 
type of word order need to be figured out by historical syntacticians, and several 
subtle syntactic subgeneralisations about the precise patterning of V2 constructions in 
OE have been discovered in a long strand of research on the topic (for example, van 
Kemenade 1987, Pintzuk 1991, Kroch, Taylor & Ringe 2000). 
 
(9) þæt hus  hæfdon  Romane to  ðæm  anum  tacne geworht 
 that building had Romans with the one feature constructed 
 O V2  S  etc. 
 
(10) þær wearþ  se cyning Bagsecg ofslægen 
 there was  the king Bagsecg slain 
 A V2  S   etc. 
 
 A semantic example: as is well known, and as was discussed in section 2, the 
meaning of words in and from the past needs subtle reconstruction. As an example of 
this, (11a) shows one sentence from an English letter from around 1740, from a Dr 
Rutherforth of Cambridge, which requires careful reconstruction of the meanings of 
most of its content words in order to be properly understood. This is shown in the 
translation into contemporary English in (11b). Both text and translation are taken 
from Honeybone & Honeybone (2010, p.c.); the main cases of semantic 
reconstruction are identified through underlining, emboldening and italics.  
 
(11a) I suppose that natural philosophy and polite literature are the branches of science that 
 you chiefly improve 
 
(11b) I assume that the fields of knowledge that you work in are chiefly science and philology 
 
 The meanings of words exist in the minds of the speakers of the languages that 
they are part of, so the meanings that have been reconstructed in (11b) are things that 
existed in the minds of a speaker of mid-18th century English. This is thus, once 
again, a case of I-linguistic, cognitive reconstruction.  
 In working to understand the linguistic systems and states discussed above, 
structural historical linguists are (whether they describe it as such or not), aiming to 
reconstruct past cognitive states. This has led to the writing of largely synchronic 
historical grammars, such as Campbell (1959), Hogg (1992b) and Braune, 
Ebbinghaus & Heidermanns (2004). It also expands the database of synchronic 
linguists, in the quest to understand what is possible or common in language. For 
example, Dresher & Lahiri (1991) show that the structure of the metrical foot in the 
phonology of Early Germanic languages was an uneven moraic trochee, a type of foot 
which had previous been claimed to be unattested (see Kager 1995). 
 In order to make the case that historical linguistics engages in cognitive 
reconstruction, one final assumption (which has thus far been silently made) needs 
brief discussion. The ontological status of the entities that historical linguists 
reconstruct has, in fact, been a subject of some controversy in the literature. Fox 
(1995: 9), discussing the status of the forms derived through comparative 
reconstruction, explains the issue thus: 
 
... are we entitled to claim for such reconstructions the status of earlier linguistic forms? This 
controversy can be summed up in a confrontation between two views of reconstruction: the 
FORMULIST and the REALIST. The formulist view regards reconstructions merely as formulae 
which represent the various relationships within the data, while the less cautions realist view 
assumes that reconstructions can be taken to represent genuine historical forms of a real 
language, which happen not to have been recorded. 
 
As discussed above, I take all reconstructions – both those done on the basis of the 
comparative method and those derived from written sources – to have the same status, 
so at least some of the points considered here are relevant to all aspects of 
reconstructive historical linguistics (although they have largely been previously 
considered in relation to the results of comparative reconstruction). Can we really 
assume that (for example) the phonological system reconstructed for PIE, or OE, or 
any other past language, should be seen as a ‘real’ I-language? The formulist position 
sees the reconstructions of historical linguists as useful fictions which are essentially 
place holders for the comparisons themselves – they should not be taken to be the real 
forms of any language. This position has influential advocates, for example Meillet 
(eg, 1903), but it must be wrong. It is only if we assume that reconstructed languages 
are real languages, and should thus be given the same status as the models of I-
language that we construct for contemporary languages, that uniformitarianism can 
place a constraint on reconstruction (as we saw above that it must). Linguistic typology 
and linguistic theory can only be used in arguments about reconstruction (such as the 
Glottalic Theory, for example), if we assume that reconstructed languages are the same 
sort of thing as the languages that linguists work with to figure out typological and 
theoretical generalisations in the first place. If we don’t, then we have no control on what 
we can reconstruct. (The need to reject postmodern doubt that we can ever understand 
the things going on in the minds of others for these claims to hold will be clear.) 
 The realist position is well supported in historical linguistics. The authors of the 
two most detailed recent considerations of historical linguistic method (Fox 1995 and 
Lass 1997) both tend towards realism in reconstruction. Thus Fox (1995: 13) writes 
that “...as realists rightly maintain, to be significant the results [of reconstruction] 
must be interpretable in historical terms”, and Lass (1997: 274) that “protolanguages 
... are simply languages like any others, if with poorer information sources ...”. The 
formulist position seeks to place the things that are reconstructed outside of the minds 
of speakers, by claiming that they are not languages at all, but this claim is not 
consistent with the practice of historical linguists, nor is it compelling. The aspects of 
languages that are reconstructed in historical linguistics must be assumed to represent 
aspects of past I-languages. We should not claim that languages are always (or ever) 
fully reconstructable (especially not if we assume that variation is grammatically 
inherent in language, as it is often difficult to reconstruct much of the way in which a 
language must have varied) but we can reconstruct parts of the linguistic systems 
involved (such as the underlying phonological contrasts of IE, or finite verb 
placement in OE), and these parts existed in the minds of speakers. Historical 
linguistics does, then, in the ways described above, seek to engage in cognitive 
reconstruction. 
 
3.2 Does historical linguistics only involve cognitive reconstruction? 
Any acquaintance with work on structural historical linguistics will show that it does 
not just involve the reconstruction of past linguistic systems. The synchronic aspect of 
historical linguistics can be underestimated, but it is subservient to diachronic study: 
much of historical linguistics aims to understand how and why one linguistic state can 
change into another. Thus, part of the interest in comparing Gothic þrija with Old 
Church Slavonic trije certainly is to reconstruct PIE forms, but part of it is to 
understand the phonological change that occurred in Germanic, by which stops 
became fricatives – part of the famous Grimm’s Law. And part of the interest in 
working out that OE had a single series of underlying fricatives is to go on to find out 
how this changed, so that we now have two series. English has lost V2, at least in the 
basic type of clauses illustrated in (9) and (10), so that the subject must now always 
precede the verb, and this has been the major focus of work on V2 in the history of 
English. Also, of course, the changes that can be seen by comparing (11a) and (11b) 
have occurred and are of major interest to historical linguists. Synchronic systems are 
often only reconstructed so that they can be compared with other, temporarily distinct 
systems and changes can be observed. 
 One central aim of historical linguistics is to work out a theory of linguistic 
change, addressing such questions as: how does change happen? can it happen within 
an individual? or does it typically happen cross-generationally, when a new 
generation misacquires the language of their parents? Historical linguistics can try to 
work out if anything is possible in change, or whether we can formulate a notion of 
what would be an ‘impossible change’,7 and if so, why they are impossible. These are 
diachronic questions and particular changes may not be anything to do with I-
language – they could be due to population movements, or misperception, or 
structural ambiguity and the unconscious choice of speakers to adopt a different 
linguistic system. While I-linguistic factors may be involved (if change can occur 
within a grammar), they need not be. Historical linguistics does engage in cognitive 
reconstruction, but that is not all that it does.  
 
 
4. What do historians do? 
Do historians engage in cognitive reconstruction? As was the case in the last section, 
certain philosophical commitments need to be made in order for this claim to hold. 
The necessary conceptual position in history is probably proportionately less common 
than that sketched for historical linguistics above, but it is compelling, is well 
represented in the literature and is accepted (if maybe tacitly) in certain key 
intellectual traditions. 
 
4.1 Does history involve cognitive reconstruction? 
The commitment in terms of the philosophy of history that is needed to make my case 
is an interpretation of the (at least partly) idealist approach to history, which is 
associated mostly closely with the historian R. G. Collingwood. Idealism focuses on 
the mental world, leaning towards the notion that a range of things (which might not 
seem to do so on a ‘common-sense’ approach) actually only exist in the mind. At its 
most extreme, idealism can argue that no aspect of reality exists independent of our 
perceptions, but Collingwood was wary of being identified as a total idealist (D’Oro 
2006), and we do not need to subscribe to full-blown philosophical idealism to accept 
                                               
7 Indeed, it seems that we can: a change such as p, t, k > f, θ, x can occur, and did as part of Grimm’s 
Law, thus explaining the correspondence of non-Germanic /t/ with Germanic /θ/, but the reverse does 
not ever seem to be attested (see, for example, Kümmel 2007). 
Collingwood’s ideas (in the same what that it is not actually necessary to accept full-
blown generativism in order to accept the mentalist understanding of language which 
fits with Chomsky’s ideas). We can retain the term ‘idealism’ to describe the 
approach, despite these and Collingwood’s own caveats, however, as is conventional 
in the philosophy of history. The idealist view of history can be understood as 
cognitivist in this way, in part echoing (3a): (i) history aims to understand past 
actions; (ii) these actions are due to human causality; (iii) human causality is due to 
the thoughts that the actors have; and (iv) thoughts exist in the cognitive realm. 
 Collingwood (1946) is his classic work on the philosophy of history (Collini & 
Williams 2004). It includes his famous definition of the idea of history: “history 
should be (a) a science, or an answering of questions; (b) concerned with human 
actions in the past; (c) pursued by interpretation of evidence; and (d) for the sake of 
human self-knowledge” (1946: 10-11). The relevant points here are (b), as mentioned 
above, and (d), which provides the perspective which leads to the ideas in focus here. 
Collingwood argued that we can understand ourselves through history because we can 
develop an understanding of psychology through history, and that this is because 
history is, practically, psychology. Collingwood wrote about a conception of 
psychology as a type of historical study, whose aim “would be to detect types or 
patterns of activity, repeated over and over again in history itself'” (1946: 224, see 
Connelly & Costall 2000), and this requires us to understand the thoughts of those 
who performed these activities in the past. (The need to reject postmodern doubt that 
we can understand the minds of others will again be clear for these claims to hold.) 
 The crucial part of Collingwood’s argument for our purposes is his emphasis “upon 
history as the interpretation of purposive action and hence upon the primacy of the 
need to recover historical agents’ own understanding of their situation” (Collini & 
Williams 2004). This is linked to his conception of psychology, but is not tied to it. 
Like many others, Collini & Williams (2004) cite Collingwood (1946: 215) as his 
most famous claim, given here in (12). 
 
(12) “all history is the history of thought ... and therefore all history is the re-enactment of 
 past thought in the historian’s own mind”  
 
 Collini & Williams (2004) write further that “this was intended not as a 
prescription of the method of historical enquiry, but a description of its success: only 
insofar as historians can ‘re-enact’ in their own thought what an act meant to its agent 
can they explain that act.” This leads us to an understanding of the definition of the 
object of study in history as actions, as D’Oro (2006) explains: 
 
... the subject matter of history, understood as a science of the mind, is actions - actions understood 
not simply as the doings of human beings but of human beings in so far as they are rational. 
Actions, in the sense in which they constitute the subject matter of historical investigation have an 
‘inside’ that events lack. To explain an event all we need to do is to subsume it under a general law 
that is obtained by inductive generalisation, through the observation of repeated events of type B 
following events of type A. In order to understand an action, by contrast, we need to render it 
intelligible by reconstructing the thought processes that inform it. 
 
 On this approach, the key goal of history is cognitive re-enactment, as in (12) – the 
historian should aim to re-enact (that is, to reconstruct) the thought processes that led 
to the historical actions that history tries to understand. The uniformitarian principle 
of (7) is important here: we must assume that the mind has not changed in the way 
that it manipulates or creates thoughts throughout history, for if it had, past thoughts 
could be unrethinkable.  
 If we take Collingwood at his word (1946: 301), re-enactment should be absolutely 
literal cognitive reconstruction: the very thought that an agent had in the past can be 
repeated.  
 
[…] in its immediacy, as an actual experience of his own, Plato’s argument must 
undoubtedly have grown up out of a discussion of some sort, though I do not know what it 
was, and been closely connected to such a discussion. Yet if I not only read his argument but 
understand it, follow it in my own mind re-enacting it with and for myself, the process of 
argument which I go through is not a process resembling Plato’s, it is actually Plato’s so far 
as I understand him correctly.  
 
 The claim is not that we need to engage in telepathy. Rather, “it is possible in 
principle to re-enact the thoughts of others because thoughts, unlike physiological 
processes, are not private items unique to the person who has them, but publicly 
rethinkable propositional contents” (D’Oro: 2006). D’Oro further explains that this 
approach has been seen as counterintuitive: 
 
since to say that the thought of the agent and that of the historian are the same appears to 
presuppose that there is only one rather than two numerically distinct acts of thought, that of 
the historian and that of the agent. Collingwood’s point, however, is that, since thought 
proper is conceptually distinct from the physiological process in which it is instantiated, the 
criterion of numerical identity that is usually applied to physiological processes is not 
applicable to thought. Thoughts, in other words, are to be distinguished on the basis of purely 
qualitative criteria, and if there are two people entertaining the (qualitatively) same thought, 
there is (numerically) only one thought since there is only one propositional content. 
 
 If a historian is able to fully reconstruct the thoughts8 that led someone from the 
past to carry out certain actions, they can be said to understand those actions, and will 
thus be able to write accurate historical works about those actions. In this sense, 
historians must engage in cognitive reconstruction. Although the act of writing about 
this is not reconstruction in itself, the same applies to the act of a historical linguist 
writing about the PIE consonantal system or OE syntax: the reconstruction must be 
done first, in order for the work which focuses on it to be written. Part of such work 
might indeed simply be a record of the reconstructions: a table of PIE consonants, or a 
description of the thinking of a historical agent, but much of it will be reflection on 
the result of the reconstruction, and an attempt to place it in its context.  
 The implications of all this are that, in order to understand the actions of those who 
agitated for national self-determination in Austria-Hungary, for example, or who 
persecuted non-Catholics in fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spain, or 
who agreed the Acts of Union between England and Scotland, we need to rethink the 
thoughts that led to the actions involved. Most of the evidence for this is found in 
texts which are contemporary with (or, maybe, later than) the actions involved, and 
considerable skill is required to interpret these documents (informed by historical 
linguistics where necessary, as discussed above, particularly around (11)). 
 The approach sketched out here requires the historian to understand the mindset of 
the people that they are interested in, to develop a sense of empathy with them (again, 
this rejects postmodern arguments, such as those of Jenkins 1991). An example of the 
impact of this approach is considered in M. Honeybone (2008:16), who is discussing 
                                               
8 We may not need to assume that the very same thought exists in the minds of the original actor and 
the historian, as Collingwood argued – if a thought is simply repeated, we may escape the danger of 
Collingwood’s mind-body distinction. 
the writing of the history of a well-known witchcraft trial from the 17th century in the 
Vale of Belvoir in the English Midlands: 
 
European scholars have appreciated that the concept of early-modern witchcraft arose as an 
imaginative response to the widespread myth of the witches’ sabbath, defined as ‘A midnight 
meeting of demons, sorcerers and witches, presided over by the Devil, supposed in mediæval 
times to have been held annually as an orgy or festival.’ [SOED] After extensive historical 
investigation it is now accepted that no actual ‘sabbath’ ever took place. Equally, however, 
the notion of the sabbath existed absolutely in the minds of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century men and women. This is a perfect justification for Collingwood’s concept of history 
as the process of rethinking the thoughts of past people: ‘wrong ways of thinking are just as 
much historical facts as right ones, and, no less than they, determine the situation (always a 
thought situation) in which the man who shares them is placed’. [Collingwood, 1946: 317] 
 
 Reconstructing past thoughts is surely not easy, but it just as surely the ideal that 
we should strive for in attempts to understand the past (at least, if we follow 
Collingwood). As the above point shows, if we are open to all the beliefs of those 
whose past we consider – ‘false’ beliefs and the general intellectual context, as well as 
anything we can glean about an individual writing a document – we can hope to come 
close enough to rethink the thoughts of those whose actions we are interested in.  
 Other historical artefacts, such as buildings and clothing from the past, can also 
help in the interpretation of past people’s thoughts, and this has led some to reject the 
idealist position. As Evans (1997: 92) writes, “[m]any sources are not written at all. 
Getting inside the head of someone who buried treasure in a grave in the fourth 
century, or made a newsreel in the twentieth, is far from easy.” This is a reasonable 
point, of course, but it is reminiscent of the mistaken distinction in historical 
linguistics between reconstructed forms which are standardly given an asterisk and 
those that are not, as discussed above. Those forms without asterisks are still 
reconstructed, even though they derive from written sources. Carr (1961: 16) explains 
that, in the same way, written sources, while privileged among types of evidence, still 
require a considerable amount of interpretation. He criticises the nineteenth-century 
‘fetishism of facts and documents’, explaining that: 
 
The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian 
approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the 
documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these documents – the decrees, the 
treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official correspondence, the private letters and 
diaries – tell us? No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought 
– what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or 
perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself 
thought he thought. None of this means anything until the historian has got to work on it and 
deciphered it.  
 
 Just as linguistic reconstruction can proceed on the basis of texts or comparison, 
historical reconstruction can proceed on the basis of texts or other historical material, 
but information found in documents still needs processing to form the basis of 
reconstruction. It all requires careful interpretation in order for us to be able to do the 
reconstruction. The comparative method and the use of non-written sources simply 
need more care and provide less good evidence.  
 Although wary of some of the implications of Collingwood’s ideas, Carr (1961) is 
generally sympathetic to the idealist approach, because it shows that history is not just 
a matter of finding dusty facts in documents. Thus, also citing Collingwood 1946, 
with an echo of (12), Carr (1961: 22) writes: 
 
“The past which a historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still 
living in the present.” But a past act is dead, i.e. meaningless to the historian, unless he can 
understand the thought that lay behind it. Hence “all history is the history of thought,” and 
“history is the re-enactment in the historian’s mind of the thought whose history he is 
studying.” The reconstitution of the past in the historian’s mind is dependent on empirical 
evidence. But it is not in itself an empirical process, and cannot consist in a mere recital of 
facts. On the contrary, the process of reconstitution governs the selection and interpretation 
of the facts: this, indeed, is what makes them historical facts. 
 
 Given all of the above, it is not unreasonable to conclude that historians need to 
reconstruct past cognitive states and actions (although this may not be a historian’s 
conscious aim) when they work to understand past actions. It may be that this must 
sometimes remain an unachievable ideal, in that we can only get close to the original 
thought, because evidence for it is lacking. The ideal remains, though, that the 
thoughts that provided the context for the actions that we know of need to be 
reconstructed, and in principle can be rethought in the mind of the historian (who can 
then aim to invoke them in the mind of the reader of their work). History does, then, 
in the ways described above, seek to engage in cognitive reconstruction. 
 
4.2 Does history only involve cognitive reconstruction? 
Just as there are with historical linguistics, there are some aspects of history which are 
not themselves attempts at cognitive reconstruction. We have already considered that 
the actual writing of history, just like the writing of historical linguistics, may rely on 
reconstruction, but also involves much more than this. It is also surely the case that 
much of the work done by the historian in order to get to the position of being able to 
re-enact past thoughts is not reconstruction itself: the work that a historian carries out 
with documents and artefacts, for example, and conducting the background work 
which is necessary to ‘do the history’. This is rather different to the conclusion of 
section 3.2. It may be that history is essentially a synchronic discipline, to the extent 
that it does not seek to deal with diachronic change to the same extent that historical 
linguistics does. Rather than largely focusing on processes of change between one 
system and another, and the possible types of such changes that can occur, there is 
more emphasis in history than in historical linguistics on understanding particular 
times and places. While not all of the conduct of history is an engagement in 
cognitive reconstruction, more of it is than is the case in historical linguistics.  
 
 
5. Two types of cognitive reconstruction 
The case has been made above that the two disciplines under discussion here both 
engage in cognitive reconstruction. We have seen that it is not all that they do, and it 
should be remembered that I am focusing on structural historical linguistics in my 
discussion here, but I have argued that cognitive reconstruction is fundamental to the 
success of both. One final point needs to be considered: while the notion of cognitive 
reconstruction connects the two disciplines, it also distinguishes them, because the 
two types of cognitive reconstruction may be conceptually similar, but they are also 
fundamentally different. 
 There are clear conceptual connections between the two types of reconstruction. 
For example, both rely on uniformitarianism - that the human mind has been the 
same throughout history2, since we evolved as a species, which means that the nature 
of language and of thought have always been the same. This, in turn, means that we 
stand a chance of being able to engage in cognitive reconstruction as part of our 
disciplines. Furthermore, both disciplines have to work with sources which are 
imperfect reflections of their true object of study: often written sources, which need 
careful interpretation. 
 There is a substantial difference between the two types of reconstruction, however. 
This derives from a distinction between the objects of study in the two disciplines, set 
out here in (13). 
 
(13a)   language is part of the unconscious mind 
(13b)   agentive thoughts are part of the conscious mind 
 
 The distinction in (13) is an important one, and it explains many of the differences 
between the approaches discussed above. While the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious mental activity is a complex one – far too complex to be properly 
considered here – we can assume a basic distinction between those aspects of the 
cognitive world to which we can, in principle, have direct access, and those to which 
we cannot. We know an extraordinary number of subtle generalisations about the 
languages that we speak, but we also know that we do not have direct conscious 
access to this knowledge – we have intuitions about what is ungrammatical, but we 
cannot easily explain why. Linguistic rules are part of our unconscious knowledge. 
Contrary to this, we can reflect on the thoughts which lead us to perform specific 
actions, and such agentive thoughts are the subject matter of history, on the 
interpretation developed above. 
 One implication of (13) is that historical linguists do not try to re-enact a past 
linguistic state in their own minds, whereas, if we follow the idealist position, this is 
what historians should try to do. Of course, the reconstruction that historical linguists 
engage in is a product of their minds, but there is no expectation that the 
reconstruction should function in their minds as it did in the minds of the original 
speakers. In history, there is some sense in which a reconstruction should function in 
the same way in the historian as it did in the original thinker. In a sense, then, 
historical linguistics engages in a type of cognitive reconstruction which is less 
connected to the researcher than is the case in history: historians use the part of the 
mind that the object of the reconstruction resided in to do the reconstruction, whereas 
historical linguists reconstruct unconscious linguistic knowledge with conscious 
intent. These differences mean that quite distinct methodological tools and approaches 
are appropriate for the different types of reconstruction that the two disciplines engage 
in. Thus, while structural historical linguists and historians can surely learn from each 
other, we cannot expect to do things in the same way. We can likely better understand 
both disciplines if we see the differences as just as important as the similarities. 
 To conclude: on the basis of the philosophical positions defended here, historical 
linguistics and history do indeed both seek to engage in cognitive reconstruction, 
although the reconstruction involved is of different types. It may be that we do not 
always succeed in our attempts at such reconstruction, or that the reconstruction can 
only be partial, and it is clear that both disciplines do not only engage in such 
reconstruction, and sometimes only do it so that they can consider something else, but 
I hope to have shown here (and to have considered a range of non-obvious but 
connected issues along the way) that historical linguistics and history are both 
connected and distinguished by the notion of cognitive reconstruction. 
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